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Nathan Oman uses Islamic marriage contracts as the
basis for reflecting on the advantages of thinking about
contract law in general terms, rather than as a series of
different and unrelated transaction types subject to




particular, Oman argues that seeing contracts as a series
of different types of transactions can work against both
good law and good outcomes in individual contract law
cases, because the assumed narrative of a transaction
type may be at odds with the precise context of the
agreement before the courts.  And this contextual
problem, Oman argues, is exactly what has happened
with the Islamic marriage contracts and mahr payment
provisions.
If the mahr agreement is construed to supplant the state’s
default rules, as intended, the question is the same as
would be applied to secular/conventional premarital
agreements: is the outcome procedurally and
substantively fair? That is, given disclosures and other
procedures at the time of signing, and the parties’
circumstances at the time of enforcement, would it be fair
to leave the wife with only the mahr payment?
In this Commentary I will argue that the lessons of mahr
agreements may be more complicated than Oman admits,
1 Wake Forest Law Review Common Law 61 (2011)
and that some of those lessons may work against Oman’s
general position on contract law.  Part I offers a brief
overview of mahr agreements; Part II looks at the place of
premarital agreements in the larger context of contract law
and family law; and Part III offers conclusions regarding
how mahr agreements ought to be treated by the courts.
As Oman points out, under Islamic law, marriage is a
contract.[3] Part of that contract—the mahr—is an
agreement of payment by the husband to the wife.  As
one commentator summarizes:
Mahr, meaning ‘reward’ (ajr) or ‘nuptial gift’ (also
designated sadaqa or faridah), is the expression used in
Islamic family law to describe the ‘payment that the wife is
entitled to receive from the husband in consideration of
the marriage.’ . . . Mahr is usually divided into two parts:
that which is paid at the time of marriage is called prompt
mahr (muajjal) and that which is paid only upon the
dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce or other
agreed events is called deferred mahr (muwajjal).[4]
The deferred payment is due if the husband divorces the
wife by talaq, a unilateral form of divorce—of which all
husbands have the right—that requires no showing of
cause.[5] There are other forms of Islamic divorce;
however, the wife has no comparable right to unilateral
divorce without showing cause (unless that right is
expressly granted to her by her husband).[6] There is
some uncertainty about the wife’s right to the deferred
payment for the other forms of divorce, but the majority
rule appears to be that she is not due payment if she
initiates the divorce andher husband is not clearly at fault
for the end of the marriage.[7]
Within Islamic practice, there is neither the right to
alimony nor the right to equitable division of property at
divorce; household possessions are divided strictly
according to title to the property being divided.[8] The
cultural understanding in most Islamic societies is that a
divorced wife is to be supported by her extended family,
not by her ex-husband.  Thus, the mahr provisions in
Islamic countries can be essential for a wife who has little
property under her own name.  Some view the mahr as
the means of support for the divorced wife, while others
view it as a disincentive for a talaq divorce.[9] Of course, it
could serve both functions.
Oman analyzes mahr agreements as a certain kind of
contract and asks whether they ought to be treated under
general contract principles, or under the special rules
applicable to conventional premarital agreements.  As
Oman points out, a different set of rules and standards
has developed for “premarital agreements”—agreements
entered just before marriage—in which one or both
prospective spouses waive some or all of their rights at
divorce (regarding property division or alimony) or upon
the death of the other spouse.  It is important to note that
premarital agreements are within the province of family
courts who specialize in family law,[10] and family-court
judges and lawyers often seem a little foggy on contract
law principles.[11] The background with which these
lawyers and judges analyze such agreements is not so
much general contract principles; rather, their analyses
often follow general family law and divorce principles.[12]
American divorce law starts with the idea that the finances
between the divorcing spouses should be dealt with in a
fair manner, using the tools of property division and
alimony (and also child support).  There are default rules
for property division in every state, which often prescribe
that an equal division, or something close to it, is the
presumed outcome.[13] Against that background,
agreements that seek to waive one party’s rights to an
equitable division of property, or the right to alimony—and
thus violate principles of fairness and public policy—are
treated by most jurisdictions with great suspicion and
reluctance.
Until the 1970s, almost all states treated divorce-focused
premarital agreements as unenforceable as contrary to
public policy.  Today, all states treat at least some
premarital agreements as enforceable in principle, though
many states impose some sort of substantive fairness
inquiry.[14] The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
(“UPAA”) came on the scene relatively late, in 1983.[15]
There are two things to note about the UPAA.  First, it is
significantly more favorable to the enforcement of
premarital agreements than was the law in most states,
and that is presently the law in almost every state that has
not adopted the UPAA.  Second, though about half the
states have adopted some version of the UPAA, a
significant portion of those adopting states have modified
it in ways that limit the pro-enforcement effect (e.g., by
adding a fairness inquiry).[16]
Thus, though Oman writes that the UPAA “creates
requirements that are meant to act as a prophylaxis
against inconsiderately bargaining away one’s rights in
divorce,”[17] the UPAA tends toward enforcement,
especially when compared to the legal standards in most
of the states that have not adopted the UPAA.  The
“prophylaxis” of the UPAA (in its unmodified form) does
not extend much beyond a writing requirement and
financial disclosure, and—contrary to Oman’s
claim[18]—a failure of financial disclosure, on its own, is
not sufficient to invalidate an agreement.  In one important
way, the UPAA makes premarital agreements more
enforceable than conventional agreements.  To avoid
enforcement of a conventional agreement, it is sufficient
to show that the agreement is unconscionable;[19] under
the UPAA, unconscionability must be combined with a
failure of financial disclosure.[20] Many states, that have
either not adopted the UPAA or have modified their
version of the UPAA, impose duties of substantive and
procedural fairness far above those imposed on
conventional commercial agreements.[21]
Oman indirectly raises an interesting and important
question: are there circumstances when agreements
between those about to be married should not be tested
under the standards of premarital agreements?  Certainly,
when one prospective spouse sells the other a book or
car on the eve of their marriage, we would assume that
the normal sale of goods rules from Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code apply, not the UPAA or any
other standard for premarital agreements.  It is only when
the parties’ agreement has the purpose or effect of
waiving a spouse’s statutory or equitable rights at divorce
(or upon the other spouse’s death) that the rules of
premarital agreements generally apply.[22]
There is a significant argument to be made—and Oman
makes it—that a mahr agreement between prospective
spouses, like the sale of a book or car between
prospective spouses, should not invoke the special rules
applicable to premarital agreements.[23] If courts often do
apply the rules of premarital agreements to mahr
agreements, it is usually because a party seeking to
enforce the mahr provisions, or to oppose enforcement,
has argued that the agreement had the effect of waiving
one spouse’s rights at divorce.  Only in such
circumstances would the standards and protective
measures—of the UPAA or other premarital agreement
rules—be appropriate.  If both parties agree that the
mahrprovision is merely a promise of payment (made
enforceable, if at all, because of the consideration from
the other party’s agreeing to marry[24]), then Oman is
certainly correct that the application of premarital
agreement law is inappropriate.  Of course, if both parties
agree on the significance of the mahr agreement, they
likely would not be in court in the first place.
If one or both parties argue that the mahr agreement had
the purpose or effect of supplanting state laws about the
division of property and alimony, then the rules of
premarital agreements are properly applicable.  As Oman
rightly points out, the initial inquiry is thus an interpretive
one: is the mahr payment to the wife (if due) meant to
supplement or supplant the financial rules of civil
divorce?[25] Although, as the article also observes, many
Islamic couples about to marry will have no opinions on
that topic one way or the other, especially if they marry in
another country where the background financial rules on
divorce are quite different.[26] But, in the United States,
where the default rules of financial settlement upon
divorce are considered to reflect the state’s strong public
policy, silence or an absence of considered intention will
(and should) be held to be insufficient grounds for
supplanting or opting out of the state’s default rules.
If the mahr agreement is construed to supplant the state’s
default rules, as intended, the question is the same as
would be applied to secular/conventional premarital
agreements: is the outcome procedurally and
substantively fair?  That is, given disclosures and other
procedures at the time of signing, and the parties’
circumstances at the time of enforcement, would it be fair
to leave the wife with only the mahr payment?[27]
Oman at times seems to assume that parties to mahr
agreements always know the nature of the promise and
the only issue we need  to concern ourselves with is
coercion.  Yet, consider Obaidi v. Qayoum,[28] in which
the prospective husband was informed about the mahr
agreement only fifteen minutes before he was told to sign
it, and it was in Farsi, a language he did not speak.  The
agreement’s significance was explained to him only after
he signed it.  After a thirteen-month marriage, the wife
filed for divorce and sought to enforce the agreement’s
promise of a $20,000 payment upon divorce.  The court
held that “under neutral principles of contract law,” there
was no “meeting of the minds” on the essential terms of
the agreement.[29] This is, at best, a very doubtful
understanding of contract law,[30] but an unsurprising one
for a family court, both relating to the court’s efforts to do
justice between the parties as it saw the matter and
relating to the court’s inexpert handling of contract law
doctrine.
Oman at one point implies that defenses of duress and
undue influence are not available for the plaintiff when the
courts treat the mahr as a premarital agreement.[31]
There is no basis for that conclusion.  Courts applying the
UPAA (and other standards particular to premarital
agreements) treat contract defenses, like duress and
undue influence, as still applicable, except when
expressly displaced.  And generally there is no
displacement, the premarital agreement rules are in fact
more protective of parties than conventional contract law,
with the exception of the UPAA’s strange provision on
unconscionability, discussed earlier.[32] Additionally, the
UPAA has an express provision allowing a party to avoid
enforcement of premarital agreements if “that party did not
execute the agreement voluntarily,”[33] a requirement that
some courts have read broadly and in a way that is far
more protective of parties than conventional contract law’s
narrowly construed doctrinal defenses of duress and
undue influence.[34]
What is ironic is that Oman’s ultimate recommendation
seems to be for more context.  He argues that such
attention to context is consistent with applying only
general contract principles,[35] but the argument could
easily be viewed instead as supporting specialized rules
based on transaction types, with a new category being
created for mahragreements.[36]
Oman has shown us that there are real disadvantages in
looking at contracts through the lens of narrow transaction
types, especially when individual agreements might fit
poorly with the assumed narrative of that transaction
type.  However, the example Oman uses—mahr
agreements treated within the category of premarital
agreements—gives only partial support for his thesis.  The
vast majority of those agreements should not be treated
as premarital agreements, not because they do not fit
some ascribed narrative, but because mahr provisions
generally ought not to be understood as waiving the
recipient spouse’s rights at divorce (regarding property
division and alimony).  However, when one or both parties
claims that the mahr agreement does waive divorce
rights, then that party should have the burden of showing
both that this reading of the mahr agreement is
reasonable and that any such waiver is consistent with the
procedural and substantive fairness safeguards created
by state law to protect those who might otherwise make
such waivers in an inconsiderate way.
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